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1 Introduction 
 
Closer economic integration within regional and international spheres has 
been the course of action characterizing the last decades of contemporary 
history. International trade, as a result of increasing removal of trade 
restrictions, and foreign direct investments (FDI), due to the 
deregulation of international capital markets, have been among the 
fastest expanding economic activities around the world. Nowadays, FDI 
lead the process of internationalization of productive activities, whose 
principal actors are Multinational Enterprises (MNEs). While undertaking 
direct investments in different countries which often belong to an 
already economic integrated area like the EU or the NAFTA,
1 MNEs 
frequently own plants in several locations, organizing their business 
internationally. As a consequence, MNEs can reallocate part of their 
production between different plants whenever is possible to capture 
comparative advantages from lower input costs (i.e. lower wages).
  
Within this context, a major concern for organized labor is that, by 
relocating production (or simply threatening to do it), MNEs are able to 
obtain concessions from unions which are frequently asked to take care of 
national interest, preserving existing jobs and economic activities and 
trying to generate further domestic employment. 
In Europe the debate on this phenomenon started since the early 90’s: in 
1993, the American multinational Hoover decided to relocate production 
activities from France to Scotland, because of the lower levels of non-
wage labor costs as well as due to the higher flexibility assured by 
Scottish workers in terms of pay and working time (EIRR, 1993). But this 
phenomenon is still current in Western European countries: at the end of 
2004, Danish Crown announced that it would close its Tulip meat factory 
at Ringsted in Denmark and relocate production to Germany, if a new local 
collective agreement failed to introduce a cost reduction equivalent to a 
wage cut of 15%.
2 
As a consequence, an increasing number of European trade unions have 
shown interest in coordinating their activities across boundaries, trans-
nationalizing cooperation: recently, the exchange of information on wage 
                                                 
1 For example, of all the flows of FDI into countries of the European Union, the 
bulk is originated within the EU itself: as of 2000, 79 per cent of inward FDI 
flows were intra-EU (see Bulletin EU 7/8, 2001). 
2 A survey of cases concerning the relocation of production processes by MNEs in 
the last years in Europe is treated in Eurofound (2006).   3
levels, working conditions and employment policies in different 
countries, as well as some shared rules in collective bargaining, have 
been introduced at least at the intersectoral level − e.g. as in the case 
of the “guideline for collective bargaining at the European level” by the 
European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) in 1998.
3 Moreover, a gradually 
increasing number of trans-national agreements between trade unions have 
been signed in the last years: from 92 in 2005 to 147 in 2007, two thirds 
of which related to European MNEs activities within the EU itself (ETUC, 
2007).       
The analysis of incentives and scopes for wage coordination among trade 
unions within a context of economic integration is somehow recent, 
although the subject is of great relevance in the study of the impact of 
globalization and “Europeanization” on labor markets and their 
institutions. Precisely, the latter is the subject of this paper. 
This work relates to a consistent body of literature that analyzes, 
within different contexts, how economic integration affects the unions’ 
strategic behavior. A first strand, represented by Huizinga (1993), 
Driffil and van der Ploeg (1993, 1995), Sørensen, (1993), Danthine and 
Hunt (1994), Naylor (1998, 1999), Borghijs and Du Caju (1999), Munch and 
Skaksen (2002), Straume (2002), Dube and Reddy (2006) and Strozzi (2007), 
examines how international integration affects wage bargaining in 
unionized countries taking in consideration the strategic interaction 
between unions. In particular, Huizinga (1993) considers the integration 
of two single union-firm bargaining units into a unified market with two 
bargaining units; the effects of wage harmonization in the two countries 
are briefly sketched. Incentives for labor union cooperation at trans-
national level instead are explored in Borghijs and Du Caju (1999), 
Straume (2002), and Strozzi (2007). Borghijs and Du Caju (1999) analyze 
the possibility for labor union cooperation in a context of international 
production whit a fully integrated product market. Starting from a very 
basic set up, with a firm having two plants in different countries and 
characterized by decreasing returns to scale in the only factor of 
production, labor, these authors find that if one labor union demands a 
wage rate too high, production is relocated to the other plant. The main 
results are that, in presence of trans-national coordination costs in 
wage bargaining, labor unions act as competitors in the labor market and 
                                                 
3 For a review on cross-border coordination activities concerning collective 
bargaining, see European Commission (2002).   4
consequently moderate their wage demands. But below a certain threshold 
value, to cooperate turns out to be increasingly an attractive option, 
which translates in a raise in wages. A further decrease in coordination 
costs reduces wage rates, but the collusive wage remains higher than the 
competitive wage.  
Conversely, the works of Straume (2002) and Strozzi (2007) analyze the 
scope for unions to adopt a collusive behavior within a context of an 
international duopoly game under which firms can either to undertake an 
export strategy or to remain in a monopoly regime, examining if collusion 
could be supported as equilibrium of an infinitely repeated game. While 
the analysis of Straume (2002) and Strozzi (2007) is addressed to the 
case of intra-industry international trade, the model presented here 
instead analyzes if coordination in wage demands could be maintained in a 
repeated game within a context of international production. In doing so, 
a framework similar to Borghijs and Du Caju (1999) is used, further 
extending the study of these authors with a comparison of the effects of 
different wage settings on welfare distribution. The analysis related to 
the sustainability of cooperative behavior by labor unions (which is 
lacking in Borghijs and Du Caju (1999)) in the present paper is developed 
according to classical game theory, with collusion depending on unions’ 
discount factors.  
A second strand of the literature analyzes the interrelationship between 
unionized labor markets and firms’ international production activities 
related to FDI. Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991) and Bughin and Vannini 
(1995) investigate the interaction between unionism and a firm’s choice 
between serving a foreign market through exports or by investing 
overseas. Using an efficient bargaining approach, Zhao (1995, 1998) 
considers the impact of intra-industry reciprocal FDI on wages and 
employment determination in a unionized international oligopoly. In a 
different set-up, the subject is also treated by Naylor and Santoni 
(2003). Nevertheless, none of these papers consider the possibility of 
transnational union cooperation which represents one of the central 
issues in this work.  
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way: Section 2 
presents the formal model of international production in presence of 
unionized labor markets. Section 3 is devoted to analyze the 
sustainability of a trans-national coordinated wage demand. Section 4 
examines the comparative static analysis and the welfare effects of the   5
different wage bargaining. Section 5 concludes with some policy 
implications and further extensions.  
 
 
2 A model of international production in unionized countries   
 
This section develops a partial equilibrium model of international 
production in unionized countries within a two-stage game framework in 
which unions and firms interact strategically. The model builds on 
Borghijs and Du Caju (1999), adding one firm in the product market which 
better reflects the reality of product market integration within the EU, 
where firms of different state members have plants in diverse countries.  
There are two symmetric countries, A and B, that belong to the same 
economic integrated bloc, and in each country two firms, 1 (which 
headquarter is in A) and 2 (whit headquarter in B), locate a plant. Firms 
produce a homogeneous good, denoted X when it is produced in A and Y when 
it is manufactured in B, using only one factor of production, labor, with 
decreasing returns to scale. In each country there is a national union 
and it is assumed that workers are fully unionized. The demand function 
is assumed for simplicity to be linear. There may be trade between the 
two countries but, since markets are not segmented, there is no intra-
industry trade. There are zero transportation costs. Consequently, if one 
union national demands excessive wage rates, production is shifted toward 
the plants in the other country and eventually imported without extra 
costs. 
It is also assumed that firms always act as Cournot competitors: even if 
this is a strong assumption when a repeated framework is considered, it 
is retained in order to isolate and investigate union behavior. The model 
is solved by backward induction: in the second stage, each firm chooses 
its output in the product market taking as given the output decision of 
the rival firm; in the first stage, monopoly unions (see Oswald, 1985) 
have complete power to set wages, maximizing rents. Two different union 
wage settings are compared: 1) a separate bargaining, where unions 
bargain separately at national
4 level with firms operating within the 
                                                 
4 Given the assumptions of this model, national and industry level bargaining 
are identical. Nonetheless, as remarked in the introduction, the greatest part 
of the trans-national union agreements occurs at industry level.    6
country; 2) a collusive agreement on wage demands by national trade 
unions. 
The production functions for firms are represented by  iA iA n x =  and 
iB iB n y = , while the product demand is given by the following 
expression: 
 
() Y X a p + − =                                                    (1) 
 
where  A A x x X 2 1 + =  is total production in A,  B B y y Y 2 1 + =  is total 
production in B and a  represents the positive intercept of the demand 
curve.
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where  iA x  is the output produced by firm i in country A,  iB y  is the 
production of the good by firm i in country B,  A w  is the wage rate paid 
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for union in country B, where 
_
w, assumed to be equal between the two 
countries, could be interpreted as the minimum wage fixed by law and 




                                                 
5 Just for simplicity it was assumed that the slope of the linear demand is 
equal to  1 = b , but it is straightforward to generalize for the case in which 
1 ≠ b   .   7
2.1 Stage 2: Cournot competition between firms  
 
In the second stage of the game, firms are engaged in a Cournot 
competition in the product market. The profit maximization problem that 
each firm faces is then the following: 
 
() [] ( )
2 2
iB B iA A iB iA y x i y x y w x w y x Y X a
iB iA iB iA
− − + + − = Π
, , max max       (5) 
 
for  1,2 i = from which first order conditions yield the following reaction 
functions 
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for firm 2, where  B A y x z 1 1 1 + =  and  B A y x z 2 2 2 + = . Notice that 
optimal quantities do not depend exclusively on the quantities produced 
by the rival firm, but also on the output produced by the affiliated in 
the other country. The following demand equations in terms of the two 
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= Ψ  and with  
 
0 < ∂ ∂ A iA w x ,  0 > ∂ ∂ B iA w x ,  0 > ∂ ∂ A iB w y , 0 < ∂ ∂ B iB w y . 
 
The output of each plant depends negatively on the wage level of the 
country where the plant is located and it is positively related to the 
wage rate of the other country. Additionally, it should be noted that, 
when wage rates are different between the two countries, labor demand in 
the country with higher wages is not equal to zero: in fact, firms’ total 
revenues depends on their total production and not on how total 
production is shared between the two countries. 
 
2.2 Stage 1, Case 1: Separate bargaining  
 
In stage 1, each union will choose a wage which maximizes its rents, 
taking as given the labor demand functions by firms. First, it is 
considered the case of separate bargaining: each national union selects a 
wage for its industry, taking as given the wage set in the other country.  
It is considered, i.e., the problem faced by union in country A. Union in 
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where  B w
_
 is the wage set in country B and which Union A takes as given. 
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A similar expression holds for Union B. In the symmetric case, the 
equilibrium wage level under separate bargaining is given by 
 
3 ϕ + = + + = = =
_ _ _ _
) ( w w w w w w w B A
SB       
   
where  ϕ  represents the rent over the minimum wage level and with 
0 > ∂ ∂
_
w w
SB : an increase in the minimum wage level implies an increase 
in the resulting wage rate. Substituting the wage rate into the demand 












for  1,2 i =  where  3 + =
_
w γ  and upper script indicates “Separate 
Bargaining”. Now it is also possible to provide an expression for total 
consumers’ surplus, given by  
 
() ( ) ∫ − − =
Q
Q p dQ Q a CS
0
          
 
where  Y X Q + = , and for national welfare, defined  for country A as  
 
A A A CS U W + + Π = 1  
 
whit  B A 1 1 1 Π + Π = Π , that is, profits generated abroad by firm 1 are 
repatriated. A similar expression holds for country B. Further 
substitutions of wage rates and quantities into union utilities, price, 
firms’ profits and consumer’s surplus expressions give the equilibrium 
values of these variables under union separate bargaining. All findings 
are summarized in Table 1.     10




    
  
2.2 Stage 1, Case 2: Collusive wage setting between national unions  
 
In this second case it is considered the collusive behavior between 
unions. In this model collusion stands for labor unions to achieve an 
agreement to fix a common wage that maximizes their joint utility, namely 
the sum of their utilities  (efficient union collusion). This agreement 
determines a wage level which is higher than that obtained under separate 
bargaining.  




U U w + = max arg                  (10)
                      
where  A U  and  B U  are given by the expression in (3) and (4). The 
solution of the maximization problem in (10) is given by  
 
γ + = + + = = =
_ _ _
) ( w w w w w w B A
C 3         
 
where  γ  is the rent over the minimum wage level obtained with the 
collusive agreement (upper script indicates Collusion) and with 
0 > ∂ ∂
_
w w
C . Substituting the collusive wage rate into firms’ demand 
functions and rearranging terms, the following production levels under 








iA = =    11
for  1,2 i = . As in the previous subsection, further substitutions into 
expressions for union utilities, price and firms’ profits give the 
equilibrium values of these variables and, subsequently, the values of 
consumers’ surplus and welfare. These findings are reported in Table 1.   
 
 
3 The sustainability of trans-national union cooperation  
 
Which are unions’ positions? As it was seen above, within this model each 
union can choose between two different wage bargaining, namely either to 
have a separate bargaining with firms operating within the country (SB), 
or to coordinate wage levels collusively (C). Depending on the selected 
type of bargaining, the relative unions’ utilities are obviously 
different. Transnational coordination is profitable if 
SB C U U > . 
Payoffs’ comparison leads to the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: The separate bargaining is Pareto-dominated by the 
collusive outcome  [ ) ∞ ∈ ∀ ,
_
0 w . 
 















SB C   
                                 
is always verified in the economic relevant range  [ ) ∞ ∈ , 0
_
w .  
 
Hence, for every economic relevant value of the minimum wage level, 
unions have strong incentives to form a collusive agreement. Collusion 
could be implemented in an infinitely repeated two-stage game. With four 
players, the set of possible strategy combinations is clearly very huge. 
It follows that a very simplifying assumptions is needed: for the 
purposes of this paper, it is assumed that firms have not the possibility 
to collude, namely firms always act as Cournot competitors. Although in a 
repeated game framework this is a very strong assumption (due to the fact 
that also firms have strong incentives to collude), it is retained in 
order to isolate exclusively the effects of unions’ coordinated wage   12
demands; but this hypothesis could be also seen as if there is a 
sufficiently effective Antitrust Authority able to avoid collusion in the 
product market. 
Starting from a situation where a coordinated wage demand is presented, 
each union will capture an immediate utility gain by unilaterally 
deviating from the collusive agreement. Deviation implies a reduction in 
the wage level which will induce the firms to relocate part of their 
productive activities within the country which union makes concessions. 
It is supposed that when one union breaks the collusive agreement, in the 
subsequent period both unions come back to a national separate 
bargaining. Such a situation is identical to the case where unions are 
adopting a trigger strategy: collusion can be sustained only if it is 
backed by some realistic threats, such that the one-period gain from 
cheating will be lower than the discounted expected value from 
punishment, which in this model means reversion to a separate bargaining. 
It is also assumed that the discounted factor is identical for both 
unions. 








≥ δ                              (11)
  
where 
C U  is the utility level obtained with collusion, 
D U  is the 
utility level deriving from the one-period defection
6 and 
SB U  the utility 
derived from punishment. The right-hand side of (11) represents the 
discount factor threshold: unions will implicitly collude at 
international level as long as they do not discount too much future and 
the instantaneous gains from unilaterally deviating the coordinated wage 
demand are low.  
Inserting the relevant payoff functions into (11) yields the following 
critical discount factor: 
                        
 
                                                 
6 If, for example, the cheating union is Union in country A, the union utility 
from deviation 
D
A U  is obtained from the following maximization 
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Closer analytical examination of (12) yields  0 >
_
/ w dδ : a reduction 
in the minimum wage level makes collusion easier to be sustained. In 
fact, as long as the minimum wage decreases, the threshold value for the 
discount factor also decreases and the punishment becomes harsher. 
Further inspection reveals also that in the economic relevant range 
[ ) ∞ ∈ ,
_
0 w  the value of the discount factor varies between 
[ ) 2 1 4 1 , ∈ δ , approaching its upper limit if the minimum wage tends to 
infinity (Figure 1). 
These results to some extent complement those obtained in the intra-
industry trade literature. Straume (2002) and Strozzi (2007) find that 
under the assumption of segmented markets, the sustainability of trans-
national implicit collusion among labor unions depends both on the trade 
cost levels (τ ), and on the degree of substitutability among traded 
goods. When trade costs are relatively low, a reduction in trade barriers 
makes deviation an increasingly attractive option for unions. While 
implicit collusion is more difficult the less similar are traded goods, 
for perfect substitute goods to deviate is comparatively more profitable 
from the unions’ perspective: in such a case, the discount factor 
threshold is independent of trade barriers for relatively high values of    14
Figure 2: Relationship between discount factor and trade cost levels 




these costs, while for relatively low values, it increases as long as 
trade barriers decrease, that is,  0 < τ δ d d . Hence, a reduction of 
trade costs makes collusion increasingly difficult to be sustained.  
Moreover, for  [ ) 1 0, ∈ τ , it is found that  2 1 > δ  (Figure 2). Comparison 
of these findings with the results derived from equation (11) and Figure 
1 allows establishing the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: In a context of international production within a fully 
integrated product market, collusion in wage levels is relatively easier 
to be supported by labor unions. 
 
This could represent a reasonable explanation of the fact that the 
transnational agreements between labor unions related to MNE activities 
within the EU are progressively increasing in the last years. To sign 
these agreements manifests the belief by unions that wage coordination at 
European level will improve  workers’ bargaining position, preventing a 
kind of international rivalry in labor markets that will lead national 
unions to act separately and hence to be engaged in future downward 
competition in wages, making concession in wage bargaining. Within the 
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4 Analysis of welfare distribution 
 
With the results previously reported in Table 1 it is possible to 
construct Table 4 that ranks the values of the relevant variables under 
the two wage bargaining. Firstly, it could be observed that world’s 
values related to single components of welfare and world welfare itself 
are in general higher in the separate bargaining scenario than with 
respect to the collusive case. Exceptions are the price level, because of 
the pass through effect of higher wage levels in case of coordinated 
bargaining, and union utilities, treated in the previous paragraph.  
Since all relevant variables are function of the minimum wage level fixed 
by governments, some additional observations could be addressed. As it is 
possible to note from Figure 3, as long as the value of 
_
w  increases and 
tends to infinity, the corresponding values for all variables are 
convergent, the distinctions between the two different cases tend to 
disappears and, as previously seen, incentives for unions to deviate from 
a coordinated wage demand become smaller and smaller. The share of 
national welfare detained by unions is obviously greater in collusion 
with respect to the separate wage setting. Moreover, a transnational 
agreement between unions improves workers’ conditions but, on the other 
hand, the welfare level under union collusion is lower with respect to 
the competitive case. However, as long as the minimum wage level rises, 
unions’ shares turn out to be asymptotically equal. This asymptotic 
behavior holds for each national welfare component. 
Nevertheless, total national welfare decreases, due to the pass-through 
effect on price of an increase in the minimum wage rate. Intuitions 
behind Table 4 and Figure 3 can be formally stated in the following 
proposition.   16






Proposition 3: A coordinated increase in the minimum wage level set by 
governments’ leads to: 
1) a reduction in welfare differences; 
2) the same welfare distribution;   
3) a decrease in world welfare 
irrespective of union wage bargaining. 
 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
Proposition 3 states that, whenever the minimum wage level is used as an 
instrument to implement redistributive policies, governments face a clear 
trade-off: an increase in 
_
w  reduces inequalities in welfare distribution 
and makes union collusion less likely, but on the other hand this is done 
at the expenses of a lower national welfare level. An increase in the 
minimum wage level translates in higher prices and consequently in a 
drastically fall in consumer surplus. These results should be taken into 
account when policy makers have to select the appropriate redistributive 
policy mix.  
 
   17
5 Conclusions: policy implications and further extensions 
 
This work represents an attempt to study the prospect of unions’ wage 
coordination at trans-national level within a context of international 
production in an integrated economy, and the consequences on welfare 
distribution deriving from this behavior, complementing a framework which 
was not fully investigated in the earlier literature. A simple model of 
international duopoly in unionized countries was presented: using a two-
stage game, effects on world welfare distribution under different union 
wage bargaining were analyzed, considering both the separate and the 
coordinated behavior in wage demands by national unions. Comparing 
payoffs under separate and coordinated wage bargaining, it was shown that 
unions face a Prisoner’s Dilemma situation because separate bargaining is 
Pareto-dominated by the collusive outcome. Hence, there are strong 
incentives for national unions to coordinate wage demands. When a 
repeated framework is considered, it was shown that in the analyzed 
framework, collusion in wage levels seems to be easier to be supported by 
labor unions relatively to sectors where international business in 
characterized by intra-industry trade. This could represent a reasonable 
explanation of the fact that the transnational agreements between labor 
unions related to MNE activities within the EU are progressively 
increasing in the last years.  
From these results, some policy insights follow: a transnational 
agreement between unions could be a possible way to improve workers’ 
conditions; colluding, unions are able to capture a greater share of 
welfare. The shortcut is that welfare level in this case is lower with 
respect to separate bargaining.
7 A possible alternative could be an 
international agreement (e.g. a set of rule generally shared) between 
governments to coordinate a raise in minimum wages, but this policy 
presents at least one problem: as long as the minimum wage level is 
higher, the welfare level decreases. An alternative policy could be to 
                                                 
7 Moreover, there are other aspects that are not explicitly modeled. The 
coordination between unions does not pass only through an agreement over wage 
level; there are many other aspects concerning the labor discipline not treated 
here; it is not easy to sign binding agreements and organize activities in order 
to achieve some common result without considering collateral problems like 
cultural, traditional and customary diversities in different countries, 
leadership position and the pursuit of particular interests. In addition, this 
is a very simple model with only two national unions, but as long as the number 
of countries (and hence of unions) increases, the cooperative equilibrium is 
more difficult to reach.  
   18
leave unions set their wage separately at national level and subsequently 
to have national government interventions in redistributing welfare 
through the appropriate instruments.   
All findings in this work are obtained under the hypothesis of a convex 
cost function, fully symmetric countries and perfect symmetry in unions’ 
preferences. Asymmetries in market structures as well as differences both 
in preferences over wages and employment and, in a context of trans-
national agreement, in beliefs concerning the likelihood of breakdown 
between  national unions, represents further extensions of the model that 
could change significantly these results. Moreover, a deeper analysis is 
needed to establish the appropriate public policy instruments in 





Proof of proposition 3 
 
To show that an increase in the minimum wage rate leads to a reduction in 
differences in welfare level independently of the union wage bargaining, 
it needs simply to evaluate the limit of national welfare expressions and 
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Since the two functions are defined on the same set and have the same 
accumulation point, the limits of their differences are equal to the 
differences of their limits, and all tends to zero. This proves sentence 
1.  
To show that a coordinated increase in minimum wage level leads to the 
same welfare distribution irrespective of the union wage bargaining, it 
needs to analyze if the components of national welfare converge to the   19
same shares as long as the minimum wage rate increases. It is obtained 
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Similarly it is obtained that the share of consumer surplus converges to 
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Independently of the union wage bargaining, an increase in the minimum 
wage rate leads, in the limit, to the same welfare shares. This proves 
sentence 2. 
To prove sentence 3, that a coordinated increase in minimum wage level 
leads to a reduction in world welfare irrespective of the union wage 
bargaining, it needs to take the derivatives of the world welfare 
expressions. It is obtained that   20
0
3 3 3
3 3 11 3 8 3 3




+ + + +














) ( ) (
) /( ) (
_ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
_
_ _ _ _ _ _
_
w w w w w
w w w w w w w
w




           (A.8)









































       (A.9)          
 
in the economic relevant range  [ ) ∞ ∈ ,
_





Borghijs, A., Du Caju, P. (1999). EMU and European Trade Union 
Cooperation. University of Antwerp (UFSIA) Department of Economics, 
Research Paper 99-013. 
Bughin, J., and S. Vannini (1995). Strategic direct investment under 
unionized oligopoly. International Journal of Industrial 
Organization 13: 127-145. 
Danthine, J. P., and J. Hunt (1994). Wage Bargaining Structure, 
Employment and Economic Integration. The Economic Journal 104 
(424): 528-541.  
Driffill, J., and F. van der Ploeg (1993). Monopoly Unions and the 
Liberalisation of International Trade. The Economic Journal 103 
(417): 379-385. 
Driffill, J., and F. van der Ploeg (1995). Trade Liberalization with 
Imperfect Competition in Goods and Labour Markets. The Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics,  97,  (2): 223-243.  
Dube, A. and  S. G. Reddy (2006). Threat Effects and Trade: Wage 
Discipline through Product Market Competition. SSRN Papers - 
id935969. 
EIRR (1993). The Hoover Affair and Social Dumping. No. 230. 
European Commission (2002). Industrial Relation in Europe. Luxembourg: 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.   21
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 
(Eurofound) (2006). Key Themes in Global Industrial Relations: 
Minimum Wages and Relocation of production Luxembourg: Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities. 
European Trade Union Confederation (2007). The Coordination of Collective 
Bargaining 2008 Available online at http://www.etuc.org/a/4459.       
Huizinga, H. (1993). International Market Integration and the Union Wage 
Bargaining. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 95 (2): 249-255. 
Naylor, R. (1998). International Trade and Economic Integration when 
Labour Markets Are Generally Unionised. European Economic Review 
42: 1251-1267. 
Naylor, R. (1999). Union Wage Strategies and International Trade. The 
Economic Journal 109 (452): 102-115. 
Naylor, R., and M. Santoni (2003). Foreign Direct Investment and Wage 
Bargaining. Journal of International Trade and Economic Development 
12 (1): 1-18. 
Mezzetti, C., and E. Dinopoulos (1991). Domestic Unionization and Import 
Competition. Journal of International Economics 31: 79-100.  
Munch, J. R., and J. R. Skaksen (2002). Product Market Integration and 
Wages in Unionized Countries. Scandinavian Journal of Economics  
104 (2): 289-299. 
Oswald, A. J. (1985). The Economic Theory of Trade Unions: An 
Introductory Survey. Scandinavian Journal of Economics  87 (2): 
160-193. 
Sørensen, J.R. (1993). Integration of Product Markets When Labour Markets 
are Unionized. Recherches Economiques de Louvain 59: 485-502.  
Straume, O. R. (2002). Union collusion and intra-industry trade. 
International Journal of Industrial Organization 20: 631-652. 
Strozzi, C. (2007). Product Market Integration and Union Collusion. 
Review of International Economics 15 (1): 17-36. 
Zhao, L. (1995). Cross-hauling Direct Foreign Investment and Unionized 
Oligopoly. European Economic Review 39:1237-1253. 
Zhao, L. (1998). The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on Wages and 
Employment. Oxford Economic Papers 50: 284-301. 